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Commentaries on Frankel
2.1 Targets and timetables: good policy
but bad politics?
daniel bodansky
From a policy perspective, cap-and-trade systems have many virtues.
They give countries ﬂexibility to determine how to reduce emissions –
whether through domestic trading schemes, taxes, subsidies, efﬁciency
standards, voluntary agreements with industry, or some other policy
instrument. They harness the marketplace to encourage climate miti-
gation efforts by whoever can reduce emissions at the lowest cost. They
can easily be scaled up or down, in response to new information about
the risks of climate change. They can be differentiated among coun-
tries, to address equity concerns. And they can be set a level that, while
requiring a country to do better environmentally than business-as
usual, still allows it to proﬁt by trading, thereby serving as a type of
side payment to encourage participation by otherwise reluctant coun-
tries such as China and India – a virtue that, as Jonathan Wiener (1999)
emphasizes, is particularly important in an international system that
relies on voluntary assent rather than coercion.
In his chapter, “Formulas for Quantitative Emission Targets,”
Jeffrey Frankel presents a particularly appealing version of the targets-
and-timetables approach, with a formula for setting targets intended
to address the equity concerns of developing countries, as well as
design features such as indexation and a safety valve that respond to
one of the principal criticisms of Kyoto-style emission targets, namely
that they represent an economic straitjacket and could impose
unacceptably high costs on countries. Of course, even Frankel’s archi-
tecture fails to solve the compliance issue, which some see as the
Achilles’ heel of the targets-and-timetables approach (Barrett 2003).
His only discussion of compliance focuses on one potential source of
noncompliance, namely high costs, without addressing the more
general problem of free riding that characterizes collective action prob-
lems such as climate change. Nevertheless, while Frankel’s proposal is
vulnerable to criticism on this score, I think that there are plausible
stories of how a state might comply, even in the absence of coercion
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(see Chayes and Chayes 1995; Koh 1997), so Frankel’s failure to solve
the compliance problem is not, to my mind, a fatal ﬂaw.
But even if we are willing to concede that targets and timetables rep-
resent good climate policy, I think it is far more questionable whether
they represent good climate politics. Frankel does not speciﬁcally say
which perspective he is adopting. At the beginning of his article, he sets
forth a list of the requirements that, in his view, “any new agreement
must meet” (Frankel, this volume, p. 32, emphasis added). But the
sense in which he uses the term “must” is not altogether clear. Does he
mean the requirements that any agreement must meet in order to be
good climate policy, or to be politically realistic? Quite conveniently,
he appears to think that there is a signiﬁcant overlap between the two
and that the architecture he proposes not only satisﬁes his policy
desiderata, but is also politically realistic, even in the near term, as the
“next step after Kyoto” (Frankel, this volume, p. 41).
The distinction between policy and politics is, of course, fuzzy. Even
pure policy design is not a strictly formal exercise; it must take into
account how people and governments behave. For example, in argu-
ing that beneﬁt-cost maximization is “right in theory” but “wrong in
practice,” because governments cannot effectively bind their succes-
sors, Frankel is making what usually we would consider a policy argu-
ment, but one based on political considerations. Politics and policy fall
along a continuum. At one end of the spectrum, we can take present
political realities as a given; at the other, we can regard them as con-
tingent and transitory. But even at the ideal-policy end of the spectrum,
where current political realities do not represent a constraint, analysis
must be consistent with immutable, intrinsic features of the political
system – it cannot assume, for example, that states will cease being
motivated by self-interest. Otherwise it will become purely utopian.
Where along this spectrum does Frankel’s climate architecture fall?
Critics of the targets-and-timetables approach, such as David Victor
(2001) and Scott Barrett (2003), see it as essentially utopian – Victor
because states will simply not be able to negotiate a series of progres-
sively stricter emission targets, Barrett because, in the absence of an
effective sanctioning mechanism, states will be unlikely to participate
and comply. For the reasons mentioned earlier, I am willing to concede
that targets and timetables may represent good policy, at least for the
longer term – one could envision a world in which successfully stricter
targets and timetables were adopted and achieved the policy desiderata
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that Frankel articulates. But, for reasons that I will explain in a
moment, I am skeptical about the political viability of this approach in
the nearer term. Frankel, in contrast, clearly thinks that his proposed
climate architecture represents both good policy and good politics – it
represents a sensible political strategy for the post-2012 period, when
Kyoto’s ﬁrst commitment period expires, as well as for the longer term.
As an academic economist with signiﬁcant government experience,
it is perhaps unsurprising that Frankel manifests an ambivalent atti-
tude toward the world of politics. On the one hand, he appears to
regard statements about politics as unscientiﬁc, because they are inﬁ-
nitely malleable. As he observes, “bringing up politics is problematic,
because every analyst can simply pronounce the proposals of others
politically infeasible, and there is no way of verifying which of them
are in fact more or less infeasible than others” (this volume, p. 36). And
he does not always feel fully constrained by judgments of political via-
bility, since “political realities change” (p. 38). On the other hand, he
is not above making such judgments himself. For example, he rejects a
carbon tax as “infeasible,” even though it would be his ﬁrst choice if
it were politically acceptable. Similarly, he rejects proposals to allocate
emission targets to achieve equal per capita emissions on the political
grounds that “rich countries would never accept the huge transfer of
wealth from them to the poor that is implicit in the per capita formu-
lation” (p. 40). Since Frankel himself raises the test of political feasi-
bility,1 I think it is fair to assess his architecture not simply in terms of
whether it represents good policy, but also in terms of whether it rep-
resents good politics. It is to that question that I now turn.
Politics is, of course, the art of the possible. And, in thinking about
what is politically possible, we need to begin by acknowledging the
modest results achieved in recent negotiating sessions. At the Eleventh
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Montreal in December 2005,
countries agreed to begin two processes – one a dialogue under the
UNFCCC on long-term cooperative action to address climate change,
the other under the Kyoto Protocol to consider further commitments for
developed country (“Annex I”) parties for the post-2012 period.
Neither process appears likely to produce signiﬁcant results, however.
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11 In describing his proposed architecture, he speciﬁcally states that it “seeks real-
istically to bring in all countries” (this volume, p. 41, emphasis added).
In recent years, the international climate negotiations have been  bogged
down, which makes it critical to ask: What have been obstacles to
progress? And what can we do to overcome these obstacles?
Jeffrey Frankel’s paper does not speciﬁcally ask these questions, but
the policy he prescribes makes some implicit assumptions about the
nature of the recent political impasse. Interestingly, his paper focuses
much more on developing countries than on the United States. Indeed,
the absence of developing countries is, in his view, “the most serious
and intractable shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol.” Although he adds
the caveat, “except perhaps for the absence of the United States,” he
sees the US absence largely as a function of the absence of developing
countries. In his view, the United States is reluctant to join Kyoto
because it does not include developing country targets. If we can solve
the developing country issue, then the issue of US nonparticipation will
take care of itself.
Frankel’s proposed solution is to give developing countries indexed
growth targets, which will alleviate their concern that greenhouse gas
emission targets could adversely impact their economic growth. If devel-
oping countries are given targets that, while below business-as-usual, are
achievable at a lower cost than the international carbon price, then the
potential gains from emissions trading should provide developing coun-
tries with an upside incentive to participate. The trick is to set develop-
ing country targets at a level that will allow them to make more from
the sale of surplus emission allowances than it costs to produce those
surplus allowances by reducing emissions. Moreover, if emission targets
are not ﬁxed but are tied to a country’s GDP, then this will protect devel-
oping countries against the downside risk that rapid economic growth
will make it costly for them to achieve their targets, since as their
economies grow, their permitted emissions will rise as well.2 Frankel
believes that by setting indexed emission targets at an appropriate level,
developing countries can be enticed to participate. And so long as devel-
oping countries participate, and the US target is set at a relatively mod-
erate level initially, the United States will be willing to join as well.
Now, this analysis may prove correct, but the history of the climate
negotiations counsels us to be cautious. The unfortunate reality is that
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12 From an environmental standpoint, indexed targets also help protect against the
danger of hot air, since if a country’s economy declines, its emissions quotas will
shrink.
developing countries have been turning down proposals along essen-
tially similar lines as Frankel’s for the last seven years, ﬁrst, in the late
1990s when they were being pushed by the United States during
the Clinton Administration; then, after the Bush Administration
rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, when the European Union tried
a similar approach at the Conference of the Parties (COP-8) in Delhi.
Earlier I noted that Frankel tries to take into account issues of poli-
tical feasibility. But he is far more sensitive to feasibility vis-à-vis devel-
oped countries, and in particular the United States, than developing
countries. He assumes that an international carbon tax is off the table,
despite its policy advantages, because it would be unacceptable to the
United States. And he assumes that target allocations based on equal per
capita emissions are a non-starter, because they would be unacceptable
to developed countries. But he fails to take seriously developing country
opposition to emission targets. He seems to assume that their opposition
is transitory and changeable. Perhaps it is just a negotiating posture. Or
perhaps it simply results from ignorance, which could be overcome
through a better sales job regarding the beneﬁts of targets. Whatever the
explanation, Frankel seems to think that it is just a matter of time until
developing countries come to their senses and realize that indexed
growth targets are in their interest – just as, after Kyoto, the European
Union eventually gave up its benighted opposition to emissions trading
and accepted trading as a desirable policy instrument.
Perhaps . . . but I have my doubts. I think we need to at least con-
sider the possibility that developing countries such as China and India
mean what they say, namely that economy-wide, binding emission
targets are unacceptable because they would unduly restrict their
national sovereignty. True, emission targets give countries ﬂexibility as
to the choice of national implementing measures. States can implement
their targets through a domestic trading scheme, taxes, efﬁciency stan-
dards, and so forth. But because virtually every aspect of a country’s
economy contributes to climate change – not only energy production,
but also transportation, manufacturing, and even agriculture – an
economy-wide target represents, both symbolically and in practice, a
constraint on a country’s economy as a whole.
Although Frankel is more attuned to US political considerations
than to those of developing countries, his assessment of the US politi-
cal situation seems somewhat tone deaf as well. It is true, of course,
that concern about developing country participation in a targets-based
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approach has been a theme of US political debate for many years, high-
lighted by the Senate’s adoption of the Byrd–Hagel Resolution in the
run-up to Kyoto.3 But US opposition to a Kyoto-like solution now runs
much deeper. In part, it stems from the Bush Administration’s ideolog-
ical opposition to any mandatory regulation of carbon emissions. But,
in part, it reﬂects a deeper opposition to international constraints on
US sovereignty, which has made it difﬁcult for the United States to join
multilateral treaties generally, even when they otherwise enjoy very
widespread support (as is the case, for example, with the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is currently tied up in the
Senate, despite support from the Bush Administration, the US military,
and the business community). It is conceivable that US opposition to
mandatory carbon regulation could change as a result of the 2008 elec-
tions; but the difﬁculty of joining multilateral treaties such as Kyoto is
a structural problem, which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Thus,
even if developing countries were to change their stripes, it is by no
means certain that this would induce the United States to reverse
course and accept binding targets and timetables. Indeed, the current
US position points exactly the opposite way. Rather than seeking devel-
oping country acceptance of emission targets, the Bush Administration
has sided with developing countries in opposing a targets-based
approach, both for itself and others.
In essence, Frankel’s paper starts from the assumption that, from a
political standpoint, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with targets
and timetables – they were negotiated in Kyoto, and they could be
negotiated again. It is just a matter of ﬁne-tuning the formula for allo-
cating targets in order to win over reluctant countries. But, I think,
the trajectory of the climate negotiations over the past decade raises
questions about whether this diagnosis of the situation is correct.
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13 However, more recent Senate action suggests that the developing country
issue is evolving. In 2005, the Senate adopted by a vote of 53–44 the
Bingaman–Domenici resolution (State Amendment 866), which calls for the
enactment of a “a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory,
market-based limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases,” without
any precondition of developing country action. Instead, the Bingaman–Domenici
resolution ﬂips the issue around, viewing US action as a means of encouraging
comparable actions by other nations. Other proposals to develop a domestic cap-
and-trade system also view developing country action not as a precondition for
the United States taking a ﬁrst step, but rather as relevant to the adoption of
more-ambitious emission targets in the future.
Like most policy analyses of the climate change issue, Frankel
implicitly sees it as a collective action problem. According to this view,
individual actors will be unwilling to take action, unless they can be
assured that their actions will be reciprocated by others; otherwise,
they will simply incur costs without getting any real environmental
beneﬁt. The task of the international climate change regime, on this
view, is to ensure some reciprocity of effort, by deﬁning appropriate
commitments for each party and providing some assurance of com-
pliance. That is what Frankel’s proposed target formula is intended
to do.
But, although the collective action analysis of climate change miti-
gation seems correct in theory, it has not done very well in practice in
accounting for the behavior of key actors. On the one hand, some
actors are pushing forward to address climate change, even though
their efforts are not being reciprocated by others. In the United States,
for example, states and cities are developing their own climate policies,
rather than waiting for action by the Bush Administration.4 On the
other hand, the Bush Administration has opposed binding emission
targets not just for itself, but for others as well. It is not trying to
free ride, as game theory would predict – it is trying to stop the bus
altogether.
Let me suggest an alternative way of conceptualizing the climate
change problem, which starts not by deﬁning the policy desiderata for
a collective response to climate change, but from the efforts that are
already emerging from the bottom up, and asks, how might we make
some incremental progress? If we start from this end of the telescope,
so to speak, there are two questions to consider. First, are we doing all
that we can to exploit the level of political will that currently exists?
Are we getting the most bang for our buck? Second, what can we do
to increase the level of political will, in order to build on the efforts that
are already under way?
Starting with the second issue ﬁrst, how might we increase the level
of political will? Now I recognize that the whole idea of political will
is fuzzy. What do we mean by it? How do we measure it? These ques-
tions do not have easy answers. And I think that Jeffrey Frankel is
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14 The Senate’s adoption of the Bingaman–Domenici resolution in 2005, combined
with its defeat the same year of a resolution focusing on international climate
change policy, support the view that bottom-up, domestic approaches may be
more promising in the short term than international treaty negotiations.
correct that many of the factors that might increase the political
salience of climate change, such as extreme weather events, are exoge-
nous to the climate change regime and, as such, we have little control
over them (except perhaps in the conspiratorial world of Michael
Crichton).
Nevertheless, to some extent, we may be able to inﬂuence the level
of political will by the way we design the climate regime; in that sense,
political salience may be partly endogenous to the system. This is one
of the rationales behind the framework convention/protocol approach,
namely, that a framework convention helps generate political will by
focusing public attention on a problem, thereby building concern
(Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1994; Bodansky 1999). It is also one of the
rationales for periodic scientiﬁc assessments, and for establishing a
long-term target for greenhouse gas concentrations or temperature
increase, toward which the international climate change effort should
aim. On this view, setting a long-term concentration target of, say,
450 ppm, could help serve as a catalyst for greater political action, the
way that John F. Kennedy’s pledge to go to the moon in the 1960s
helped galvanize public opinion.
Of course, thus far the UNFCCC has not been terribly successful
in building public concern. The IPCC, by contrast, has had a much
greater impact, particularly its fourth assessment report issued in 2007.
What more might the international negotiating process do to build
political will to address climate change? One option would be to link
the climate change agenda more closely with the development agenda,
in order to piggyback climate change on other issues that developing
countries care about (see Pershing, this volume). Similarly, in Western
countries, many suggest linking climate change with issues of greater
public concern, such as energy security.
Turning to the ﬁrst issue, are we wringing out as much progress as
possible from what little political will currently exists? In my view, the
answer is no. The existing international climate change regime unnec-
essarily limits what can be accomplished internationally. First, it
includes virtually every country in the world, a factor that makes the
negotiations unnecessarily complex and difﬁcult. Although it is
often said that climate change is a global problem requiring a global
solution, in fact just twenty-ﬁve countries account for more than 80
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. If the climate change
negotiations were limited to a smaller group of countries – the so-called
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“big emitters,” for example, or the big economies, or like-minded
states, or perhaps regional groups – this would simplify the negotia-
tions considerably (Victor, this volume).
Second, although the Kyoto Protocol sets individualized targets
for each Annex B country, it contains only one form of commitment:
absolute targets and timetables, tied to historical emissions. Given the
wide range of differences in national perspectives and preferences
regarding climate change, the climate change regime needs a more ﬂex-
ible approach, which allows different countries to assume different
types of international commitments – not only absolute targets, but
also indexed targets, taxes, efﬁciency standards, and so forth. This is
one of the important conclusions of the Pew Climate Dialogue at
Pocantico, in which senior policymakers, business leaders, and NGO
representatives participated.5 A more ﬂexible, bottom-up approach
would attempt to build on what countries (and their subdivisions and
businesses) are already doing, rather than imposing a solution from the
top down (Pizer, this volume).
Would a more ﬂexible, bottom-up approach provide a long-term
solution to the climate change problem? Probably not, at least if
climate change mitigation proves expensive. The more costly climate
change mitigation is, the more states will want to ensure that their
efforts are being reciprocated by other states, as the collective model
action predicts – and the more policy architectures like Frankel’s will
become crucial. But a bottom-up approach might, at least, help break
the current impasse and get the ball rolling. It reﬂects, not ideal policy,
but rather less than ideal politics.
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